Is the QDR a fraud...

In preparation for greater attention to defense policy and planning as the fourth Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) approaches completion and publication in early 2010, PDA has renovated its Defense Strategy Review Page, now in much more dynamic format. We expect it will be the go-to place on the Internet for information and debate about the QDR and US defense strategy and budgets. The new site is at:

http://www.comw.org/wordpress/dsr/


The inaugural post of the new site follows:

Is the QDR `a PR stunt' or a sincere effort to reconcile posture and budget with strategy?

by Charles Knight

Last fall I attended a seminar at MIT entitled "Analytical Tools for the Next Quadrennial Defense Review" given by senior analyst who had worked on several QDRs. The QDR is an every-four-years Pentagon study mandated by Congress and meant to review how closely the defense posture and its supporting budget fits with the national strategy. The seminar presenter spent an hour detailing the analytical methods of those who worked on the "force structuring" and policy studies that provide the basis for the QDR review process. That process is ongoing this year in preparation for the release of fourth QDR in early 2010.

After the presentation a former member of the National Security Council who happened to be seated to my right turned to me and said, "[The QDR] seems like a fraud."

More recently Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-HI), Chairman of the House Armed Services air and land forces subcommittee, referred to the QDR as a "PR stunt" and a "PR exercise" (as reported by Marjorie Censer, Inside the Pentagon, 18 June 2009.) Rep. Abercrombie then went on to offer a less than precise elaboration, saying, "It's all Thunderbird stuff, booms and all that."

I can not be all that sure what the former National Security Council member or Rep. Abercrombie meant by their characterizations of the QDR. But, having followed all four QDRs fairly closely, I can make an educated guess at what they are getting at.

Congress has intended that through the QDR the Pentagon will make a serious attempt to reconcile the national defense strategy to the defense posture of the services and from that presumed point of congruence reconcile it to the defense budget. Policy analysts frequently complain that strategy, posture and budget are dangerously out of whack. If the QDR process addresses this problem and then does the analytical and policy work required for making real advances toward reconciliation then we can judge that it is meeting its stated purpose. If it results in a public document that uses rhetorical flourish in order to mask disjuncture of ends and means and to perpetuate prior posture and budget directions, then it is something like a 'fraud' or 'PR exercise.'

The unfolding 2010 QDR process gives us a good opportunity to look for evidence of either real reconciliation or PR exercise. A few pieces of evidence:

* There are dozens of high level policy professionals and planners in the Pentagon who have more than a cursory responsibility for aspects of the QDR. They work with hundreds of others, some inside the military and many civilian consultants and contractors. Models are built and simulations are run. Task forces and issue teams work the results. No doubt
many of these people would be indignant if you told them their work was simply serving public relations and had little effect on the direction of policy.


* On the other hand, modeling output and even the output of task forces are quite sensitive to starting assumptions and specifications. Senior civilian and military leaders in the Pentagon carefully review input parameters and seek to influence how the particulars of output is summed up and presented to those responsible for the next steps in the process of getting to the final report. "Startling findings" and their policy implications are unlikely to find their way into the document drafts unless senior leadership wants them there.

* Consider also that Defense News has reported that the Pentagon is moving ahead with the FY'11 budget process before the budget work on the 2010 QDR is completed. Minimally, this is suggestive of prior budget and posture decisions running the QDR output, rather than the other way around.

[ The Defense Strategy Review Page will take note of what other evidence emerges pertaining to the question of whether the QDR is 'a fraud', 'a PR stunt', or a sincere effort to reconcile posture and budget with strategy? I invite your comments and viewpoints on this important question. ]

Report on Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq

Quickly, Carefully, and Generously: The Necessary Steps for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq
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Executive Summary PDF
From the Task Force for a Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq, a Commonwealth Institute publication, June 2008.
Preface by U.S. Representative James P. McGovern (MA - 03). Twenty-five initiatives the US can and should take to reduce violence and regional instability as the US leaves Iraq.

Where Do We Go From Here?
New York Times 7 July 2008 lead editorial cites the Responsible Withdrawal from Iraq report above.

Like a Mirage in the Desert: Full Withdrawal May Recede into the Time Horizon
By Charles Knight. Presentation at the United States Institute of Peace panel on The Future of the U.S. Military Presence in Iraq, 25 July 2008 (as prepared). Listen to the Podcast of the panel presentations and the Q&A.

Recent Publications

Re-Envisioning Defense - An Agenda for US Policy Debate and Transition
Executive Summary PDF
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By Carl Conetta, 27 June 2008.
Summarizes problem areas in recent US defense policy as well as several broad topics of debate that touch on them all.

The Role of Force & the Armed Forces in post-Cold War US Foreign Policy: What have we learned? Cautionary lessons for the next administration
Security Policy Working Group symposium at Parsons: The New School for Design, NYC, 10 April 2008.
Presentations: Andrew Bacevich, "The Bush Doctrine: Origins and Demise" (Podcast); Carl Conetta, "Out from the House of War: A Litmus for New Leadership in Security Policy" (printable .pdf format)

Cul de Sac: 9/11 and the Paradox of American Power
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By Carl Conetta, PDA Research Monograph #13, 05 February 2008.
Post-Cold War US security policy evinces a disturbing paradox: it has been delivering less and less security at ever increasing cost. The reasons reside not in the differences between the Bush and Clinton administration, but in their points of similarity.

A Prisoner to Primacy
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By Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #43, 05 February 2008.
The United States is entering a period of policy transition, but there is a dearth of new thinking regarding security policy. The debate remains paralyzed by 9/11 and mesmerized by military primacy. Progress depends on rethinking the role of force.

Toward a Sustainable US Defense Posture: An Option to save $60+ Billion Over the Next Five Years

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By Carl Conetta, PDA Briefing Memo #42, 02 August 2007.

Fiscal realities and public opinion may compel a cut in US defense spending. The memo outlines an option to save $60+ billion over the next five years by reducing fighter aircraft and aircraft carrier fleets.


Also see
Unified Security Budget for the United States, 2008, Foreign Policy in Focus and the Center for Defense Information, April 2007. Proposal re-balances defense, homeland security, and international affairs expenditures. PDA is a member of report's task force.

Dissuading China and Fighting the 'Long War', World Policy Journal. The 2006 US Defense Review advanced two new strategic vectors for the US armed forces - one targets a putative "global Islamic insurgency"; the other puts America on a collison course with China.

Congressional Withdrawal Plans, Iraqi Permanent Bases, More Ground Troops

Issue 4 of Defense Analysis Bulletin, by Bipasha Ray, 01 May 2007

Congressional "withdrawal" plans only call for partial withdrawal from Iraq. At least 40,000 to 60,000 troops would have remain behind to train Iraqi forces, battle terrorists and protect American "interests." This brings up the unresolved issue of permanent bases. Does an increase in ground forces mean that the United States plans to be in Iraq indefinitely, and is Iraq prelude to building a larger military?

Read all back issues of the Defense Analysis Bulletin here.